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Legitimacy is regarded as one critical aspect of biodiversity management and nature conservation 
arrangements. Multi-level governance is claimed to pose several challenges to legitimacy. The 
aim of this paper is to review some legitimacy challenges in multilevel governance contexts, and 
to analyse empirically biodiversity governance in different EU countries in the light of these 
challenges. Four legitimacy criteria – legal compatibility, accountability, representation and 
inclusion, and transparency – serve as a framework for theoretical and empirical analysis. The 
analysis is based on twelve cases of multilevel biodiversity governance from different EU 
countries. The results show that several of the legitimacy challenges in multilevel governance can 
be observed in the cases, for example the poor inclusion of certain concerns at some time points 
of the decision process, difficulties in being accountable towards multiple levels simultaneously, 
or the weak visibility of the decision process either for the general public or for the immediate 
participants.  
 
Keywords: multi-level governance; biodiversity; legitimacy; legal compatibility; accountability; 
inclusion; transparency 
 
1. Introduction: legitimacy and multilevel governance of biodiversity 
In a broad understanding, legitimacy refers to the acceptance of the entire political system (van 
Tatenhove 2008), or, in a narrower sense, to the approval of a specific law, policy, or a single 
decision by the public or stakeholders. Legitimacy presupposes authority – a legitimate authority 
is the one that is recognized as valid or justified by those to whom it applies (Bekkers and 
Edwards 2007). Thus, awarding legitimacy means to voluntarily comply with the rules of the 
governing authority (Scharpf 2009). 
 
Legitimacy concerns the question of how and why processes and their outcomes that lead to 
collectively binding decisions should be accepted or supported by those whose interests are 
affected by the decisions (Engelen et al. 2008). Foundations of legitimacy are usually divided 
into two strands: substantive and procedural (Coglianese 2007). Substantive sources of 
legitimacy, such as religion, charisma, tradition, or scientific evidence, have increasingly lost 
their legitimating force (Engelen et al. 2008). However, at the same time, procedural legitimacy 
3 of 31 has gained importance (ibid.). It has three dimensions:  
−  input legitimacy: to what extent can decision subjects (co)determine the agenda, 
−  output legitimacy: the extent to which the outcomes of decision processes serve the 
interests of decision subjects, and  
−  throughput legitimacy: to what extent the design of the actual decision-making procedure 
is perceived as fair and inclusive in order to transfer individual interests into collective 
reasons (van Tatenhove 2008).  
In liberal democratic societies, governments are typically legitimized through electoral processes, 
and their decisions are given weight by legislation and other forms of regulation or policy 
(Lockwood 2010). However, in addition to elections, more direct forms of citizen influence in 
political decision-making – participatory approaches – are regarded as an essential source of 
legitimacy (Fung 2006; Kessler 2004) since they are expected to allow more interactive 
communication between decision-makers and stakeholders, and to create better chances for the 
stakeholders to be heard in early stages of decision processes. 
 
Legitimacy can encompass different dimensions. On the one hand, it is connected to different 
legal norms. Here, legitimacy is closely related to legality (the word lex in Latin refers to law): a 
decision is legitimate if it is lawful, i.e. its content is in accordance with the law (Bekkers and 
Edwards 2007). A decision may also obtain its legitimacy from correctly following procedural 
rules in order to reach that decision (ibid.). On the other hand, legitimacy usually goes beyond 
mere legality (van Tatenhove 2008) because rules cannot justify themselves simply being rules, 
so that in order a rule to be accepted, it also has to correspond to some moral principles (Jentoft 
2000). For example, legal legitimacy based on laws may depend much more on their present 
social acceptance – and thus its social legitimacy – than upon the (questionable) legality of their 
formal ratification (Fallon 2005). Thus, political forms of legitimacy, i.e. principles such as 
democratic representativeness and openness in decision-making, transparency, and accountability 
are important dimensions of legitimacy (Coglianese 2007). 
 
The concept “multi-level governance” (MLG)  highlights the significance of multiple layers of 
governing and the increasing influence of non-state actors (NGOs, private actors) in decision 
processes (Hooghe and Marks 2004). Since its emergence in the 1990s, the concept has gained 
popularity in the environmental arena. Environmental disturbances are usually intertwined across 
different levels: global changes are linked to a series of local phenomena and vice versa (Cash et 
al. 2006). Biodiversity loss, degradation of habitats and the subsequent decrease in the quality of 
the services ecosystems provide to humans are examples of such issues that expand over spatial, 
4 of 31 jurisdictional, institutional etc. scales. In order to respond to such scale-sensitive problem, 
governing biodiversity issues encompasses different governance frameworks (e.g. the EU 
regulations like the Habitats and Birds Directive) and wider governance regimes (from 
international biodiversity agreements to local traditions and rules of biodiversity resources) 
(Baker 2003; Paavola 2007). In conclusion, governance of environmental issues has to take place 
at multiple levels, since the complexity of governance solutions allows the system to be more 
flexible, resilient and to address issues on scales that correspond to wider physical and social 
impacts of environmental disturbances (Meadowcroft 2002; Paavola 2007). 
 
Legitimacy is regarded as one critical aspect of biodiversity management systems and nature 
conservation arrangements (Brechin et al. 2002). Adopting an authoritarian protectionist 
approach could easily lead to morally and pragmatically questionable prescriptions that most 
likely will not safeguard biodiversity conservation and sustainable management in the long term 
(ibid.). However, increasingly more debates revolve around the implications of multi-level 
governance on various aspects of legitimacy (Altides and Kohler-Koch 2009; Bekkers and 
Edwards 2007; Benz 2001; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006; 
Papadopoulos 2008; Peters and Pierre 2004; Rauschmayer and Behrens 2008). Multi-level 
governance is claimed to pose several challenges to legitimacy, for example by complicating the 
establishment of clear accountability relationships (e.g. Papadopoulos 2008), or hindering the 
inclusion of relevant concerns in decision-making (see for example Peters and Pierre 2004). 
 
The aim of this paper is to review some of the legitimacy challenges in multilevel governance 
contexts, and to analyse empirically biodiversity governance in different EU countries in the light 
of these challenges. Four legitimacy criteria – legal compatibility, accountability, 
representation and inclusion, and transparency – serve as a framework for theoretical and 
empirical analysis. This framework has been applied elsewhere, e.g. by Rauschmayer and 
Behrens (2008) to assess the legitimacy of species management in the example of the Great 
Cormorant in the EU. The empirical part of this paper is a meta-analysis of original case studies 
that have been conducted in the framework of a Marie Curie Research and Training Network 
GoverNat: Multi-level Governance of Natural Resources: Tools and Processes for Water and 
Biodiversity Governance in Europe. 
5 of 31 2. Analysis framework 
2.1. Legitimacy criteria and their challenges in a multilevel governance context 
Based on a literature review, Table 1 defines the four legitimacy criteria and provides an 
overview of some of their potential challenges in multilevel governance. A more detailed 
discussion of the criteria and of the challenges follows in the four sub-paragraphs below (2.1.1 – 
2.1.4). 
 
Table 1. Legitimacy criteria and some examples of their challenges in multilevel governance 
Criterion  Includes...  Some examples of its challenges in a MLG context 
Legal compatibility 
…legal legitimacy: lawfulness, legality of a 
decision, process, etc. in a given context, considering 
relevant formal as well as informal rules 
•  difficult to consider multiple legal frameworks from 
different levels simultaneously 
 
•  possible gaps in legal support for participation across 
levels → how can decisions taken in participatory processes 
at lower levels have a genuine impact on policies at higher 
levels? 
Accountability 
...democratic control mechanisms that require 
a) defining responsibilities and those being 
responsible (accountability holdees); 
b) the responsiveness of accountability holdees 
towards other actors (accountability forum) 
•  responsibilities shared between actors across different 
levels → less clarity, who is responsible of what (the problem 
of “many hands”) 
 
•  accountability holders are accountable towards forums 
at different levels → difficult to “satisfy” multiple levels 
Representation & 
inclusion 
...provision of equal opportunities to participate and 
influence decision-making for all relevant 
stakeholders  
Ideally, all relevant interests and needs should be 
included in the final decision or at least represented 
in the process 
•  MLG favours organized interests → formally less 
organized interest groups are less represented & included 
 
•  national / international level interests are better 
included → power is shifted away from sub-national levels 
 
Transparency 
…making decision-making process visible and 
clearly understandable to all relevant parties 
(insiders and outsiders) 
•  transparency is weakened because of the informality 
of decision-processes → issues may be clearly visible for 
mostly those actors who stand close to network members 
 
2.1.1. Legal compatibility 
In a broad sense, compatibility means that parts of a system work smoothly together (Adams 
1996). The decision process and its outcomes can be considered as legitimate when they comply 
with formal and informal procedures recognized as adequate in the respective context by all 
parties affected (Rauschmayer and Behrens 2008). These formal and informal procedures may 
include legal rules and regulations, as well as social norms (Licht et al. 2002). The concept of 
legal compatibility further implies that these rules have to be accepted by those to whom they 
apply. Thus, in order to ensure that decision processes will be conducted and outcomes 
6 of 31 implemented in a legitimate way, one needs to consider at least legal frameworks and other 
formal but also informal rules in a given socio-political context, as well as understand and respect 
the ways how these rules are perceived by the relevant parties. 
 
Governing in multilevel contexts is rather a coordinative and interactive process between 
different actors from various levels than a hierarchical implementation of international or EU 
laws and policies at national and sub-national levels. Thus, designing and conducting decision 
processes that simultaneously consider legal frameworks from different levels while respecting 
other sets of rules can be challenging. Ensuring such compatibility has proven to be difficult in 
several cases of the European biodiversity governance. For example, current legal frameworks at 
national as well as at EU level are less conducive to species management than to species 
conservation (Rauschmayer and Behrens 2008; Rauschmayer et al. 2008). This mismatch has 
brought about conflicts between different resource users and conservation-oriented stakeholders 
(ibid.). 
 
Another challenge in multi-level governance contexts concerns legal support for participation 
across different levels. How do participatory arenas developed at different levels relate to each 
other, e.g. in terms of power distribution (Berghöfer et al. 2008)? For example, the 
implementation of the ecosystem approach in fisheries management in the EU has shown that in 
several cases participatory arenas at lower levels have had only little influence on relevant 
policies at higher levels (ibid.). 
 
2.1.2. Accountability 
Accountability refers to the processes of holding someone answerable and responsible for its 
performance (van Kersbergen and van Waarden 2001). Accountability can be understood as a 
relationship between an actor (accountability holdee) and a forum (accountability holder, agent of 
accountability), in which the actor has an obligation to inform the forum, to explain and to justify 
his or her conduct; the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face 
consequences (Bovens 2007). Accountability holdees are usually governmental bodies who are 
expected to be responsive towards their constituencies – the people who are the ultimate source 
of their legitimacy (Lockwood 2010). In representative democracies, governmental bodies are 
supposed to gain such legitimacy through voting: people have delegated their sovereignty to the 
government, and accountability is supposed to function in the opposite direction of delegation 
(Bovens 2007). Thus, in order to establish clear accountability relationships, first, the roles and 
7 of 31 responsibilities of accountability holdees should be defined (Lockwood 2010), and second, 
effective communication and feedback mechanisms should be established between accountability 
holders and actors. 
 
Accountability may face several challenges in multilevel governance. First, institutional 
complexity of multilevel governance can obscure, who is accountable, and for what (Rhodes 
1998). The “problem of many hands” makes accountability relationships unclear (Bovens 2007): 
since decisions pass on from many actors, it is finally difficult to identify, who exactly is 
responsible for which outcome. 
 
Second, in multilevel governance, accountability holdees face multiple forums, each of them 
requiring different types of accountability relationships. In addition to traditional electoral 
accountability (political or democratic accountability), accountability holdees are expected to be 
responsive towards courts (legal accountability), towards professional bodies (peer 
accountability), or towards stakeholders and interest groups (social accountability) (Bovens 
2007). However, in multilevel governance contexts accountability mechanisms are claimed to be 
too diffuse to form a coherent system and direct democratic accountability of policy-makers is 
regarded to be weak (Papadopoulos 2008). Moreover, since accountability holders in multi-level 
governance are usually positioned at different policy levels, it is necessary that accountability 
functions both upwardly – governing bodies are responsive towards upper levels – and 
downwardly – constituencies can hold governing bodies accountable (Lockwood 2010). This 
creates though a situation of “two-level” accountability where satisfying both levels at the same 
time can be a considerable challenge (Papadopoulos 2008). 
 
Third, non-state actors have a growing influence in policy-making on multi-level governance 
contexts but only some of them might be politically accountable (Altides and Kohler-Koch 
2009). Thus, a further cause for the democratic deficit of multi-level governance is the transfer of 
political authority from directly accountable governments to non-accountable political actors, e.g. 
NGOs, private parties (Skogstad 2002). For example, supra-national institutions are not strongly 
democratically accountable towards sub-national actors but their role in multilevel governance is 
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Legitimacy is affected by the extent to which all relevant interests are represented and included in 
the decision-making process and/or its outcomes (Rauschmayer and Behrens 2008; Rauschmayer 
and Risse 2005; Rauschmayer and Wittmer 2006; Wittmer et al. 2006). It has an ethical ground – 
each person should have a say in decisions which will affect him/her, and it also means to 
provide opportunities to participate for marginalized groups (Lockwood 2010). However, the 
actual practice of representation and inclusion depends on many factors which are either the 
attributes of the conveners of participation (such as whether the interests are known, what is the 
goal of participation), the capacity and motivation of participants, or the wider institutional 
context (e.g. the legislative framework) (Dietz and Stern 2008). Further, defining “relevant 
interests and needs” or drawing appropriate boundaries of participatory processes need case-by-
case consideration and may still remain highly contested issues (Billgren and Holmen 2008; 
Mostert et al. 2007). 
 
The multilevel context of participatory decision processes poses some further difficulties for 
representation and inclusion. It is doubted whether all relevant interests gain access to political 
processes or are sufficiently taken into account in policy-making of multilevel governance (Benz 
2001). To take an example from biodiversity policies, ensuring adequate inclusion of all relevant 
interests from various policy levels has remained challenging in the case of the EU-wide 
cormorant action plan idea (Rauschmayer and Behrens 2008). 
 
One possible reason for decreased inclusiveness in multilevel governance might be its reliance on 
informality in decision-processes (Peters and Pierre 2004): formal arrangements, such as 
legislation, are considered as too rigid frameworks for multilevel governance. However, formal 
rules though ensure equal rights for all groups to be heard; thus – to what extent informality 
means inequality (ibid.)? Regarding the input side of the political system, multilevel governance 
has the advantage of providing a multitude of access points for organized interests (Benz 2001). 
Thus, formally less organized stakeholders are less likely to have good opportunities to 
participate and have a say in decision-making processes (Peters and Pierre 2004). Furthermore, to 
what extent informality entails outcomes reflecting the interests of dominant players, i.e. more 
influential stakeholders? In the EU, multilevel governance may in practice favour the interests of 
nation states – even though structurally less powerful sub-national actors are claimed to gain 
greater influence in multi-level governance contexts; regional and / or local governments are 
nevertheless often likely to find their interests poorly represented in practice (ibid.).  
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Transparency refers to the visibility of decision-making processes, the clarity with which the 
reasoning behind decisions is communicated, and the ready availability of relevant information 
about a governance authority's performance (Lockwood 2010). As inclusiveness, transparency is 
a normative requirement grounded in ethics, stating that stakeholders should have at least the 
right to know about the issues that affect them (ibid.), if they cannot affect decision-processes 
over those issues. Therefore, if participatory processes cannot ensure that all relevant interests are 
taken into account, decision-makers should at least make the process transparent for those 
affected (Rauschmayer and Behrens 2008; Rauschmayer and Risse 2005; Rauschmayer and 
Wittmer 2006; Wittmer et al. 2006). Additionally, transparency is connected to accountability in 
the sense that actors responsible for final decisions are obliged to inform others about their 
conduct, which implies clear communication of decision-making rules as well as the content of 
decisions. 
 
However, in multilevel governance systems, the complexity of decision-making structures might 
impede achieving transparency of decision-processes, making it difficult for supervisory 
organisations and for citizens to hold those participating in decision-making accountable (Benz 
2001). Since decision-processes are often informal – informality is believed to enhance 
negotiations and the achievement of compromise –, they can also be weakly visible 
(Papadopoulos 2008). Policy processes are claimed to be well-visible for only those principals 
who stand closer to the actors directly involved in decision-making (ibid.). Thus, internal 
transparency of a decision process in multilevel governance may be higher than transparency for 
outsiders, i.e. for the general public or media. 
10 of 31 3. Legitimacy analysis of the cases 
3.1. Description of the cases 
 
Twelve cases are summarized (Table 2) on the basis of their country, topic (central governance 
issue), time period of decision processes, main decision-making levels concerned, and the nature 
of the participatory processes. All case descriptions are based on materials gathered in the 
GoverNat project, with the support from the GoverNat PhD fellows
2. 
 
Data has been gathered from nine EU countries, including older member states as well as some 
of the recently accessed countries, like Slovakia [4], [5] or Hungary [11], [12]. Most of the cases, 
e.g. [2], [4], [5], [6], [11], [12] concern protected areas' governance, such as Natura 2000 
designations or management. They however differ in their focus on administrative level and in 
terms of specificity: the Finnish Natura 2000 case [2] examines designations at national level, the 
case of implementing the Habitats and Birds Directives in Spain [6] analyses designations and 
management at national, regional and local level, and the Portuguese Natura 2000 case [9] 
addresses specifically the drafting of a management plan for a certain Natura 2000 area. Some 
other cases examine biodiversity governance at a more abstract level: drafting of biodiversity 
strategies and action plans, e.g. cases [1] and [8]. Among other issues, cases [4] and [10] study 
the role of species management (bark beetles) in protected area governance. 
 
In many of the cases, decisions tend to be ultimately taken by national institutions (i.e. key 
decision-making level is national); however, other levels are involved as well or indirectly affect 
governance processes. In fewer cases, key decisions were made at local level. In many of the 
cases, decision-processes are still ongoing; in some other cases, such as [1], [2], [8], [9], some 
final decisions have been made. The nature of the participatory process as a whole differs from 
case to case. Several cases, like [1], [2], [6], [7], [8], [9] represent more formally organised 
participation (processes initiated and / or led by an (external) convenor) which, in some cases is 
quite specifically targeted towards certain stakeholders, e.g. involving the amateur naturalists in 
case [1]. In contrast, some other cases, such as [3], [4], [5], [10], [11], [12] are quite unstructured 
                                                 
2   The GoverNat PhD fellows have supported to the compilation of the respective cases as follows: Minna 
Santaoja – cases 1, 2, 3; Sonja Trifunovova – cases 4 and 5; Mireia Pecurul – cases 6, 7, 8; Catrin Egerton (with 
Carla Gonzalez) – case 9; and Cordula Mertens – cases 10, 11, and 12. The work on the cases has been between 
integrating information from different sources that were available for the fellows at the time of analysis (see 
references in the last column of Table 2) and their own analysis. The intellectual rights regarding the case 7 fully 
belong to Papageorgiou et al. (2008) and regarding the case 8 to Nordbeck and Pregernig (2008). 
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and open discussions, cooperation initiatives or opposition movements, without a central 
coordinator / organizer.Table 2. Case descriptions 
Nr.  Country  Central issue  Time period 
Key decision-
making level; 
main other levels 
involved 





in the national 
biodiversity action 
planning 
according to CBD 





Organized process, initiative from national 
governmental actors who directly 
contacted certain local level stakeholders 
(amateur naturalists) 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). 2007. Conserving Biodiversity – the UK Approach. 
http://www.ukbap.org.uk/library/UKSC/DEF-PB12772-ConBio-UK.pdf 
Ellis, R., Grove-White, R., Vogel, J. and Waterton, C. 2005 Nature: Who Knows? English Nature/CSEC/Natural 
History Museum Publication.  http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/centres/csec/pubs.htm. 
Ellis, Rebecca & Waterton, Claire. 2004. Environmental citizenship in the making: the participation of volunteer 
naturalists in UK biological recording and biodiversity policy. Science and Public Policy. Volume 31, number 2. 
Ellis, Rebecca & Waterton, Claire. 2005. Caught between the cartographic and the ethnographic imagination: the 
whereabouts of amateurs, professionals, and nature in knowing biodiversity. Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 2005, volume 23, pages 673 – 693. 
Waterton, Claire & Ellis, Rebecca. 2003. ”Anglers, Ramblers and British Naturalists: the creation of records and 
much, much more”. Paper for presentation at the Workshop ”Science and Democracy”, JF Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, USA, 29 June – 1 July 2003. 
Waterton, C and Ellis, R (2006) Amateurs as Experts: Harnessing New Networks for Biodiversity, End of Award 











Organized consultations by national 
governmental actors for national level 
organized interest groups, opposition from 
local landowners (complaints, hunger 
strike) 
Heikkinen 2007; Hiedanpää, 2002; 2004; Hilden et al. 2005; 1998; Kangas et al. 2005; Malmsten 2007; Oksanen 
2003; Sairinen et al. 1999; Veistola 1997Heikkinen, Ilkka (ed.) and interministerial group of editors. 2007. Saving 
nature for people. National strategy and action plan for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in Finland 
2006-2016. Ministry of the Environment. Edita Publishing, Helsinki.  [In Finnish; with English abstract.] 
Hiedanpää, Juha. 2004. Making Environmental Policies Reasonable. A Study of the Consequences of Social 
Diversity for Regional Forest Policy of SW Finland. Academic dissertation. Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 1030. 
Tampere University Press, Tampere. 
Hiedanpää, Juha. 2002. European-wide conservation versus local well-being: the reception of the Natura 2000 
Reserve Network in Karvia, SW Finland. Landscape and Urban Planning 61 (2002) 113-123. 
Hildén, Mikael; Auvinen, Ari-Pekka & Primmer, Eeva. 2005. Evaluation of the Finnish National Action Plan for 
Biodiversity. Ministry of the Environment, The Finnish Environment 770. Edita Publishing, Helsinki.  [In Finnish; with 
English abstract.] 
Hildén, Mikael; Tahvonen, Olli; Valsta, Lauri; Ostamo, Eira; Niininen, Iris; Leppänen, Jussi & Herkiä, Liisa. 
1998. Impacts of the Natura 2000 network in Finland. The Finnish Environment 201, Finnish Environment Institute. 
Edita, Helsinki. [In Finnish; with English abstract.] 
Kangas, Pekka, Jäppinen, Jukka-Pekka & von Weissenberg, Marina (ed.) 2005. The Implementation of the 
National Action Plan for Biodiversity in Finland 2002-2004. Third Progress Report. Ministry of the Environment. Edita 
Prima Ltd, Helsinki. [In Finnish; with English abstract.] 
Malmsten, Annukka. 2007. Rajaaminen. In: Laine, Markus; Bamberg, Jarkko & Jokinen, Pekka (eds.) 
Tapaustutkimuksen taito. Gaudeamus, Helsinki. 
Oksanen, Annukka. 2003. Confrontation between local and international interests in matters of nature 
conservation. A case study of the Natura 2000 controversy in South-Western Finland. Academic dissertation, Annales 
Universitatis Turkuensis C 192. University of Turku, Department of Geography. [In Finnish; with English abstract.] 
Sairinen, Rauno; Viinikainen, Tytti; Kanninen, Vesa & Lindholm, Arto. 1999. Suomen ympäristöpolitiikan 
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Self-organised informal cooperation 
between local amateur naturalists and 
regional, local partners, open to all 
interested parties 
Itkonen, Tatu (2008) Lempäälän Ahtialanjärvelle suunniteltavasta lintutornista. E-mail posted on the Pirkanmaan 
lintutieteellinen yhdistys, BirdLife's regional association's, email list, 30.5.2008. 
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practice in the 
Tatras National 
Park (TANAP) 






Conflicts between foresters and 
conservationists at various levels, creation 
of a non-governmental body in contrast to 
a powerful governmental committee 
Kluvánková-Oravská, T., Kozová, M. a ostatný (2005), Smerom k Trvalo  Udržateľnému Tatranskému Regiónu 
(nezávislá štúdia strategického charakteru), REC Slovensko v spolupráci so spoločnosťou pre trvalo udržateľný život v 
Slovenskej Republike, Bratislava   
Křenová, Z., Polák, P. (2007), Hodnotenie Dokumentu, NPR Tichá a Kôprová- Štúdia Posúdenia Vplyvu 
Navrhovanej Činnosti na Priaznivý Stav Predmetu Ochrany, Štátna Ochrana Prírody, SR   
Renn, O., (2007), Glossary for GoverNat (manuscript). 
Vološčuk, I. (2000), Trvalo Udržateľný Rozvoj v Biosférickej Rezervácii Tatry, Vydavateľstvo Technickej 
Univerzity vo Zvolene  
[5] Slovakia 
PAN-Parks 










Self-organised cooperation initiative from 
SRNAP administration to join with the 
PAN-Parks certification system, opposition 
from foresters and local tourism 
entrepreneurs to the initiative 
Kluvánková-Oravská, T., Chobotova, V. (2006) Shifting governance. Managing the commons: the case of 
Slovensky Raj National Park. Sociologia 38: 221-244. 
















Organised consultations and information 
disclosure for the public at national 
(Spain) and sub-national level (Catalonia); 
cooperative agri-environmental measure 
launched by a sub-national governmental 
body, involving local farmers and 
irrigation company at local level (Lleida) 
Aubin, A. (2004): Owners Escape Unharmed. Activation of Institutional Rules in Rivalries between Heterogenous 
Water Users. Paper presentation in “The commons in Age of Global Transition: Challenges, Risks and Oportunities”. 
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of protected areas' 
governance 





Organised participation of stakeholders in 
the form of national park management 
boards (problems with representativeness); 
increased number of scientific advisory 
bodies; participation of general public in 
the environmental impact assessment on 
protected areas 
Papageorgiou, K., Kassioumis, K., Vakkas, M. 2008. Restructuring of management bodies for protected areas in 
Greece. Universität für Bodenkultur Wien, Department für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften. 
http://www.boku.ac.at/sfh/reports/Research_report_3_2008.pdf 
[8] Austria 












Organised participation in the form of a) 
meetings of the National Biodiversity 
Commission; b) involvement in the 
editorial group, and c) commenting on the 
drafts of the Biodiversity Strategy. In 
addition, some activities to introduce the 
process to the wider public were arranged. 
Nordbeck, R., Pregernig, M. 2008. The Austrian Biodiversity Strategy: A Blocked Governance Process. 














Organised process: local authorities (the 
municipality of Montemor-o-Novo in the 
Alentejo region) arranged workshops and 
information events for a wide range of  
stakeholders in order to negotiate with 
Gonzalez, Carla (personal communication) 
Renn, O., (2007), Glossary for GoverNat (manuscript). 
Rede Natura 2000: Sitio de Monfurado (online: http://www.cm-montemornovo.pt/natura/monfurado.htm, accessed 
March and May 2008) 
Santos, Fernando Teigao (2005) The region of Alentejo in search of a new development model based in human 
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  them the management measures and to 
build their support for the Monfurado 
Natura 2000 area management plan 
capital: reality, rhetoric, or utopia? (Paper presented at the International Conference on Regional Growth Agendas, 
Aalborg, Denmark, 2005, online: http://www.regional-studies-assoc.ac.uk/events/aalborg05/teigao.pdf) 
[10] Germany 














Opposition from local stakeholders (local 
dwellers, tourism companies, 
municipalities) and their negotiations with 
nature conservation authorities from 
different levels. Open discussions from 
which everybody could take part of 
Nationalparkverwaltung Bayerischer Wald (1999a): Nationalparkplan; Leitbild, Ziele (draft). 
Nationalparkverwaltung Bayerischer Wald (1999b): Nationalparkplan; Walderhaltungs-, und 
Waldpflegemaßnahmen (draft). 
Nationalparkverwaltung Bayerischer Wald (2001a): Nationalparkplan; Bildungs-, Informations-, und 
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (draft). 
Nationalparkverwaltung Bayerischer Wald (2001b): Waldentwicklung im Bergwald nach Windwurf und 
Borkenkäferbefall; Wissenschaftliche Reihe, Heft 14. 
Nationalparkverwaltung Bayerischer Wald (2005): Wilde Waldnatur. 
Nationalparkverwaltung Bayerischer Wald (2007): Jahresbericht 2006. 
Renn, O., (2007): Glossary for GoverNat (manuscript). 
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Discussion Papers 3/2007 – GoverNat 1, March 2007. 
RUBICODE (2008): D 7.1 Web report on the effectiveness and appropriateness of existing conservation policies 
and their integration into other policy sectors; case study on Biodiversity policy in Germany (unpublished draft). 
Wittmer, H., F. Raushmayer, B. Klauer, (2006). How to select instruments for the resolution of environmental 






Land use conflicts 
in the Kiskunság 
National Park 





Opposition from local stakeholders 
(mostly farmers) about the rights to use the 
land under the conditions of poor 
financing and water scarcity; informal 
cooperation among stakeholders 
Flachner, Zs., Kovács, E. (2003): Cooperation between the Kiskunság National Park Directorate and a local 
farmer. Case study for the OECD Working Group on Economic Aspects of Biodiversity, Budapest. 
Gilly, Zs. (1999): The Mosaic of alkaline plains and moving sand dunes – The Kiskunság National Park, pp.155-
166, in Tardy, J. (chief ed.): Conserving Hungary’s Heritage –The National Parks and World Heritage Sites, 
TermészetBÚVÁR Alapitvány Kiadó, Budapest, 1999. 
Gómez-Baggethun, E., Kelemen, E. (2008): Linking Institutional Change and the Flows of Ecosystem Services: 
Case Studies from Spain and Hungary. Proceedings of the 2ndTHEMES Summer School: 118-145 (draft version). 
Renn, O. (2007): Glossary for GoverNat (manuscript). 
Homepage of the Kiskunság National Park http://www.knp.hu/ 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cumans 





and governance of 
the Körös-Maros 
National Park 






Negotiation between ENGOs and national 
park administration, informal cooperation 
between farmers and national park 
administration (farmers and national park 
administrators attend each others' 
meetings, national park directorate 
consults farmers regarding agri-
environmental schemes) 
Bird Life Hungary: http://www.mme.hu/  
Bolno-Takács, K. (1997): Körös-Maros National Park Directorate. Brochure by: European Centre for Nature 
Conservation; The European Union PHARE programme; Ministry for the Environment, Hungary; National Authority 
for Nature Conservation, Hungary. 
Domokos, A. (1999): An oasis wedged among cultivated lands –The Körös-Maros National Park., pp.167-178, in 
Tardy, J. (chief ed.): Conserving Hungary’s Heritage –The National Parks and World Heritage Sites, TermészetBÚVÁR 
Alapitvány Kiadó, Budapest, 1999. 
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Hungarian Central Statistical Office: http://portal.ksh.hu 
Kalotás, Zs. (2004): Körös-Maros National Park. pp.130-151, Kalotás, Zs.: Hungary´s National Parks –Nature and 
landscape, Alexandra Kiadó, Pécs. 
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Renn, O. (2007): Glossary for GoverNat (manuscript). 
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3.2. Legal compatibility 
International and / or EU legislation has been an important driver for initiating national and sub-
national decision-making processes in many of the cases, such as implementing the Birds and 
Habitats Directives across various levels in Finland [2], Spain [6] and Portugal [9]; or developing 
the National Biodiversity Strategy in Austria [8] and compiling the National Biodiversity Action 
Plan in the UK [1] according to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). However, in 
some cases national decision processes had a more complex relationship to the international 
institutional arena. For example, in the case of [5], decision-making was initiated by local nature 
conservation administration who tried to employ the international PAN-Parks certification 
scheme as the main measure to fulfil their responsibilities concerning nature conservation. 
However, the bottom-up initiative in this case has not yet managed to find enough support from 
other stakeholders to build a cooperative network. In the bark beetle management conflict of the 
Bavarian Forest National Park [10], national and sub-national nature conservation authorities 
were inspired by international recognitions for the natural state of the park (the IUCN award and 
Europe Diploma for national parks), using these as means to comply with national and sub-
national nature conservation legislation. 
 
What role does legislation play in supporting or constraining participatory approaches in the 
cases? Participation in several of the cases, like [4], [5] and [10], is more of informal nature, i.e. 
networked interactions between different stakeholders, members of the public, and scientists. 
Here, it is more difficult to examine the impact of legal requirements on participation because of 
the prevailing impact of the informal institutional environment. In addition, decision-processes in 
several of the cases are ongoing, so it is still too early to depict the exact relationships between 
the legal requirements and actual participatory practice. 
 
Other cases give mixed results in terms of implications of legislation on the practice of 
participatory approaches. For example, from the international level, the COP guidance for 
developing and implementing national biodiversity strategies and action plans according to the 
CBD (COP 2008) encourages “preparing, updating and implementing national biodiversity 
strategies and action plans with the participation of a broad set of representatives from all major 
groups to build ownership and commitment”. However, in the case of drafting the National 
Biodiversity Strategy in Austria [8], the participatory platforms (mainly the National Biodiversity 
Commission, NBC) provided opportunities to be involved for actors from multiple levels but 
16 of 31 their participation did not have much influence on the actual biodiversity policies, e.g. most of 
the outputs of the NBC are not legally binding. This could be one reason why the participants’ 
degree of motivation to contribute considerably decreased in the latter phases of the initiative, 
and the National Biodiversity Commission suffers from declining participation in recent years. In 
some of the Natura 2000 cases, e.g. [2] or [6], the nature of informative and participatory 
approaches was compatible with the legal requirements for participation at EU and national 
levels. However, these requirements turned out to be insufficient in practice, e.g. in terms of 
leaving little room for deliberation between different stakeholders and various governmental 
bodies, which resulted in antagonism and opposition among these parties. For example, in the 
case of the Natura 2000 areas' designations in Catalonia [6], information distribution was 
foreseen by the national legislation but the information events and some consultations were held 
only after the conflicts over site designations between different parties already turned out to be 
clearly visible. 
 
It seems that guaranteeing compatibility between formal international / EU requirements, 
national legislative frameworks and the practice of biodiversity governance is not a remarkable 
problem as such. For example, in the case of the bark beetle management conflict in the Bavarian 
Forest National Park [10], decisions taken by governmental actors were compatible with supra-
national, national or sub-national legal principles of nature conservation, but the decision process 
and its outcome were not accepted by local people until their concerns were considered and taken 
into account. Instead, implementing supra-national requirements in a way that the informal social 
norms in a given context are respected has proven to be rather problematic in several of the cases. 
The case of the Finnish Natura 2000 designations [2] shows that the conflicts between 
environmental authorities and local people, farmers and foresters were in part caused by the fact 
that the historically important autonomy of local landowners was not adequately considered 
when communicating the messages about the Natura 2000 network to them. A similar example is 
the governance of Kiskunság National Park (Hungary) [11] where farmers' traditional 
independence in land use decisions has possibly made their cooperation with each other as well 
as with the administration challenging. Moreover, it seems that incompatibilities between the way 
how international formal biodiversity protection rules are implemented with regard to local social 
norms, can result in further problems with formal legal compliance. For example, problems 
emerged with implementing the Habitats and Birds Directives as regards to meeting the deadlines 
of submitting the national lists of potential Natura 2000 areas [2] or the sufficiency of those 
proposals in Finland [2] and Spain [6], or EC court cases about the impact of development 
projects on the favourable status of Natura 2000 areas in the Slovak Tatras National Park 
17 of 31 management case [4] or the Catalonian Natura 2000 implementation case [6].  
 
3.3. Accountability 
The cases demonstrate well the complexity of accountability relationships in multilevel 
biodiversity governance, e.g. the multiplicity of accountability forums (accountability holders) at 
different levels, and respectively different types of accountability. The central decision of the 
BAP process in the UK [1] – validity of biodiversity knowledge – is made at several policy 
levels, from international to local. However, in this process, the national government has the final 
mandate for decision making and can also be held accountable towards international institutions 
for the national biodiversity action planning. In those cases that focus on Natura 2000 
designations and management in Finland [2], Spain [6], Slovakia [4], or Portugal [9], national 
and sub-national governmental bodies (depending on the country-specific administrative context) 
can be held legally accountable towards EU institutions. In some other cases, where international 
biodiversity agreements have significant influence, national governments should be accountable 
towards international institutions, such as the UK national government towards COP of the CBD 
regarding the national BAP [1]. Thus, the cases suggest that in addition to being democratically 
accountable towards their electorates, governmental bodies are also expected to be upwardly 
accountable towards supra-national bodies, as well as be socially accountable towards their 
stakeholders, e.g. local people, economic actors, and other interest groups. 
 
Responsibilities for biodiversity governance are in many cases shared between actors from 
different levels. However, in several cases, such as [5], [6], [7], responsibilities are not clearly 
defined, or are shared without proper resources necessary for effective implementation. For 
example, in the case of the Slovak PAN-Parks certification process [5], since some 
responsibilities for nature conservation are not very clearly defined between State Nature 
Conservancy and State Forests (two major governmental actors dealing with biodiversity and 
forestry issues respectively), their relationships are rather antagonistic. Moreover, the State 
Nature Conservancy has much less legal and other resources to carry out its duties than the 
forestry body. Similarly, in recent years the national government has transferred many 
responsibilities for environmental issues to the regional government, however, without proper 
resources. 
 
In the case of implementing the Natura 2000 network in Catalonia, Spain [6], the responsibilities 
and resources for nature conservation are somewhat ill-defined between two sub-national 
18 of 31 governmental departments. Department of Environment and Housing (DMAiH) – the main body 
responsible for implementing the Natura 2000 network in Catalonia (sub-national level) – shares 
some responsibilities for Natura 2000 with another governmental body – Department of 
Agriculture, Cattle Farming and Fishing (DAR). However, the latter has much more financial 
resources, including finances for biodiversity from the rural development funds, to fulfil its 
responsibilities than the first. This, together with their controversial interests (biodiversity 
conservation versus agricultural production respectively) has caused some conflicts between the 
two departments. 
 
In a similar way,  responsibilities for protected areas' management are somewhat vaguely defined 
in case [7] between the newly established Greek Ministry of Environment, Planning and Public 
Works (MoEPPW) and the Ministry of Rural Development and Foods, which has long carried the  
primary responsibility for nature conservation issues. National park management boards – core 
administrative bodies at local level – comprise of actors from different sectors and levels, but 
struggle to deliver their duties because they get limited technical assistance and advice from 
upper levels (e.g. from the MoEPPW ). 
 
3.4. Representation and inclusion 
In most of the cases, stakeholder settings connected to different biodiversity issues are numerous 
and heterogeneous, representing different levels, policy sectors and public-private affiliations. 
The case of bark beetle management in the Bavarian Forest National Park [10] is a good example 
of biodiversity matters spanning across different policy levels and the various stakeholders 
associated to these levels. The international level, represented by the IUCN, affects the issue by 
awarding the international recognition to the national park; the European level (Council of 
Europe) awards the European Diploma for national parks; the sub-national level (German state) 
is the central actor who has the power to finally decide on all nature conservation issues within 
the state. At lower levels, the national park administration, local national park committee, local 
authorities, but also farmers, foresters and other local people, tourism companies, environmental 
NGOs are important stakeholders affected by the park management decisions. 
 
Several cases, e.g. [2], [4], [5], [6], [10] began with antagonistic relationships or conflicts 
between key stakeholders. Irreconcilable interests emerged between, e.g. biodiversity protection 
at one side and unsustainable use of natural resources – intensive agriculture, forestry, or tourism 
– at the other side. However, inclusion turns out to be a complex issue that is affected by several 
19 of 31 factors, such as by the object of inclusion, by the way different concerns and world-views are 
communicated, and by the institutional background on inclusion. 
 
The object of inclusion is an important matter for example in the case of the BAP planning in the 
UK [1]. Here, the participatory process was organised for a specific purpose (to fulfil the expert 
knowledge gaps on certain species) and not adequate attention was paid to the concerns of the 
participants: their personal experiences, value systems, etc. Thus, in this case only certain aspects 
like knowledge claims in a pre-defined format were included, but at the same time, different 
interests were not well-represented or included. 
 
In several cases conflicts were aggravated because of the poor ability of different parties to 
address the differences in their world-views and problem perceptions. Nature had different 
meanings for the local landowners and for environmental authorities in the Finnish Natura 2000 
designations case [2]: for the landowners, it was a place for economic production, for 
environmental authorities, it was something valuable to conserve. In this case, the landowners 
were disappointed with the mistrust shown by the environmental administration towards their 
ability to conserve the natural values as part of their normal agricultural practices. In the Tatras 
National Park forest management debate [4], foresters argued that bark beetles constitute a 
considerable risk for the forest ecosystem, whereas nature conservationists claimed the bark 
beetles to be an everlasting natural phenomenon. Similarly, in the bark beetle management 
conflict in the Bavarian Forest National Park [10] local peoples' notion of a well-managed forest 
differed considerably from that of the nature conservation authorities, but this difference was 
initially not adequately addressed in the decision process.  
 
In some cases, the socio-political context of the case (e.g. the historical background) strongly 
affected the inclusion of different concerns. In the case of the governance of the Körös-Maros 
National Park [12], expert knowledge has long had a high status in the society, for example 
during the communist regime in Hungary. Thus, scientific, expert, and environmental-NGO 
interests tend to be better included in the decision-making over the park management than local 
farmer's interests.  
 
However, several of the cases where some relevant concerns were initially not included, evolved 
towards better acknowledgement and inclusion of different interests, values, or knowledge 
claims. The conflict in Finland over the Natura 2000 designations [2] eventually made the 
environmental authorities better understand the locals' needs, and the whole process functioned 
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the interests of national level governmental stakeholders. However, in the course of the 
participation process of amateur naturalists, the stakeholders (government, scientists and 
naturalists) eventually started to be better informed about each others' expectations. Similarly, 
through an interactive public discussion, the conflict over bark beetle management in the 




Transparency turns out to be problematic in several cases. Since the expectations of amateur 
naturalists, governmental actors and scientists in the knowledge production process while 
compiling the UK Biodiversity Action Plan [1] were initially not clearly communicated, amateur 
naturalists were dissatisfied with the process.  One reason for this might be that the expectations 
were not clear to the relevant parties when the decision process started, but turned better visible 
in the course of the process. In the Ahtialanjärvi lake restoration initiative in Finland [3], rules 
and assumptions were clearly communicated among the network of naturalists who were directly 
involved in the restoration works, but the visibility of the process was somewhat poor for the 
wider public and for the environmental administration. 
 
Problems of transparency also emerged in the Finnish Natura 2000 case [2] where landowners' 
opposition towards Natura 2000 was primarily caused by farmers' misunderstandings of the 
nature conservation requirements to be stricter than they actually were. In the case of Körös-
Maros national park [12], the farmers did not initially well understand the requirements of agri-
environmental schemes. 
 
In several cases, the problem was rather the inability to communicate the perceptions or 
expectations of different stakeholders than transparency of the process as such. For example, in 
the cases [2], [4] and [10], the stakeholders initially opposed to each other's notions of 
sustainable forestry and biodiversity management, and this non-recognition of each other's 
perspectives has been one of the causes for the initially antagonistic relationships between the 
stakeholders. 
 
However, like the inclusion of different interests, decision-making processes also became more 
transparent in the latter phases of several cases: conflictual processes functioned as learning 
21 of 31 devices that made the authorities and other stakeholders to accept and recognise better each 
other's problem perceptions, needs and values. 
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Compatibility with legislation 
Incompatibilities between informal social norms and formal rules, rather than legal compatibility 
per se were problematic in several of the cases. Informal rules included for example historically 
embedded patterns of land use rights which give basis for local stakeholders' rights and duties 
regarding natural resource management and for their perceptions about nature conservation 
requirements. This finding reinforces the need to equally consider formal and informal 
institutions, in order to ensure effective governance in the environmental arena: the goals of 
formal and informal rules should, in an ideal case, be compatible and complement each other 
(Pahl-Wostl 2009). However, since informal rules tend not to be documented and they are usually 
enforced outside of the legally sanctioned channels (ibid.), being aware of these rules and taking 
them into account might be more difficult than to comply with formal rules. 
 
The cases do not provide a straightforward answer to the question of how do legal frameworks 
and actual participatory practice most meaningfully relate to each other in multilevel contexts. 
One may argue that since the Habitats and Birds Directive are in principle not compatible with 
interactive participation, the implementation of the Natura 2000 network has triggered many 
conflicts in various EU member states, like the Finnish and Spanish Natura 2000 cases analysed 
in this paper, and some other studies, e.g. Alphandery and Fortier (2001), Eben (2006), or Sauer 
(2006) have shown. However, some other cases where participation has primarily been based on 
informal interactions, as has been for example the case of the lake restoration in Lempäälä [3], 
suggest that legislative support of participation might not always be a considerable factor to 
ensure legitimate decisions. 
Accountability 
The complexity of accountability relationships in multilevel governance systems – diversity of 
relevant policy levels, different accountability forums and types of accountability – (Lockwood 
2010; Papadopoulos 2008; Rhodes 1998) is well illustrated by the analysed biodiversity cases. 
Many cases have problems with defining and/or sharing of responsibilities between different 
actors from various levels. It refers to poorly conducted decentralisation (Lockwood 2010; Ribot 
et al. 2006) – when duties are diffused to a wide range of different actors who however do not 
have much control over these issues. Under such conditions, accountability may be ultimately 
weakened (ibid.), supposedly because the actors are struggling to carry out their responsibilities 
23 of 31 and may eventually not be able to conduct the duties they are expected to perform. Some of the  
analysed cases show how lower levels are searching for new ways of exerting influence in order 
to achieve their aims under the conditions of poor distribution of power and resources. For 
example, in the Slovak PAN-Parks certification case [5] local conservation authorities used the 
PAN-Parks certification scheme to fulfil their nature conservation duties. However, since 
decision-processes in many cases are still ongoing, it is too early to test the hypothesis whether 
accountability in such cases will ultimately be weakened or not. 
 
As noted by previous studies (Lockwood 2010; Papadopoulos 2008), some cases suggest that 
being equally effectively accountable in two directions at the same time might be a significant 
challenge. During the Natura 2000 designations in Finland [2], national governmental bodies are 
finally accountable towards EU authorities with regard to complying with the requirements of the 
Birds and Habitats Directives, and the national governmental bodies struggled hard to comply 
with the requirement of submitting a national proposal of Natura 2000 areas to the EU 
Commission within a given time-frame. At the same time, they did not have enough time and 
other resources to organize a proper communication and consultation campaign for the lower 
levels' stakeholders. In this case, upward as well as downward accountability was initially weak: 
national government did not meet the deadline of submitting the Natura 2000 areas' proposal, and 
it did not manage to inform local and regional stakeholders adequately. Nevertheless, in this case, 
local stakeholders' (farmers, foresters, landowners) protests made governmental actors to respond 
to their concerns and resulted in a better communication between the lower and upper level, 
which eventually can also result in better accountability. 
 
However, the case materials did not contain sufficient information on the character and on the 
actual functioning of accountability mechanisms, i.e. what are the paths of information provision 
and the ways of how people can question the actions of decision-makers. Since a clearer picture 
of accountability mechanisms would help to understand the implications of the problems with 
decentralization, two-level accountability, etc. that can be observed in the cases, taking a closer 
look at the accountability mechanisms and their effectiveness would be a relevant topic for 
further research. 
 
Representation and inclusion  
The question of inclusion and representation has perhaps brought up the most issues from the 
four analysis criteria, foremost in terms of the relationships between informal processes and 
inclusiveness, the dynamics and the object of inclusion. 
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Multi-level governance settings often rely on informal decision-making rather than formal 
structures (Hooghe and Marks 2004; Peters and Pierre 2004) which is claimed to favour the 
inclusion of upper levels' concerns and organized interests better than others. Since most of the 
analysed cases in this paper deal with stakeholder participation and much less with public 
participation (i.e. with fully non-organised interests), it is difficult to examine whether non-
organised interests are more weakly included in the cases. Nevertheless, the issues of 
representation and inclusion come up in some cases. For instance, the case of the Austrian 
biodiversity strategy [8] shows that initially the National Biodiversity Commission was designed 
to be a promising device of involvement, representing a diverse set of stakeholders from multiple 
sectors and levels. In practice, participation in this body has rather been a state-driven process 
(dominated by public authorities) and although it has been a forum open for all interest groups 
and NGOs, the power relations in it are biased towards more resourceful interest groups with 
good relations to the ministries. Do MLG settings favour the inclusion of interests from some 
levels, especially upper levels, more than others (Peters and Pierre 2004)? Indeed, participation 
was initially mainly organised for national level interest groups in the Finnish Natura 2000 case 
[2]; and in the current debates about forest management in Tatras National Park [4], national 
governmental interests dominate whereas local and especially environmental concerns do not 
have much influence. Conversely, in the lake restoration case in Finland [3], local as well as 
international interests are represented in the decision-process. However, this representation of 
interests from various levels has though lead to a conflict and up to now, no solution has been 
found that would satisfy both sides: environmental administration and volunteer naturalists 
(Santaoja 2010).  
 
In their analysis of legitimacy of the EU-wide cormorant action planning, Rauschmayer and 
Behrens (2008) found that various interests were better included in latter phases of the decision-
process than in the beginning. Inclusion of concerns from different levels has proven to be a 
dynamic process in most of the cases in this paper as well. In some conflictual cases, local 
interests were initially not adequately considered, but in several cases, such as [2] and [10], the 
processes evolved towards better accepting and including local concerns too. Thus, one has to 
examine inclusion at different time points of decision-processes, in order to make adequate 
claims about inclusiveness. The cases also indicate that conflicts, when addressed constructively, 
have the potential to function as learning processes, providing a good basis for mutual 
understanding and acknowledgement of interests. Additionally, the object of inclusion can be a 
significant issue. Some of the analysed cases suggest that not inclusion per se but rather what is 
25 of 31 included (values, interests, knowledge claims, etc. (Berghöfer et al. 2008)), is problematic. The 
case of the amateur naturalists' participation in the BAP planning in UK [1] demonstrates a 
mismatch between the expectations of the conveners of participation and the participants 
regarding what should be included. Initially the BAP process primarily focussed on the inclusion 
of the knowledge claims of amateur naturalists, since this was the priority of the governmental 
actors, and was somewhat insensitive to other aspects of inclusion that were important for 
participants (their personal experiences, aesthetic values of biodiversity, etc.). 
 
To conclude, the cases do not provide a straightforward answer to the question of what role does 
informality play in favouring or hindering the inclusion of different interests in decision-making 
processes. Some of the informal cases, like [3], [10], [11], [12], even better include different 
interests than those cases where participation has taken a more structured format. This tends to 
support the idea that informal communication can form a crucial part of formal participatory 
approaches (Buanes et al. 2005; Lee 2007). Formally organized participatory arenas, like public 
meetings, require certain capacities from the participants, such as good knowledge on local 
issues, facility in talking about them as well as time and resources to attend meetings (Lee 2007). 
However, participation in more informalized contexts, like repeated direct contact between 
farmers and nature conservation authorities where park administration seeks constructively 
contact with the farmers (for example by attending farmers' meetings), have been quite effective 
to build trust and mutual understanding between local stakeholders and nature conservation 
authorities in the Körös-Maros National Park [12].   
 
Transparency 
As inclusion, transparency in multi-level contexts is claimed to be weak, mainly because of the 
informality of decision-making processes (Benz 2001; Papadopoulos 2008). Similarly, several 
cases analysed in this paper have shown that ensuring transparent decision-making is not an easy 
criterion to fulfil. Transparency for the general public has indeed been questionable in the more 
informal cases, like [3] and [12]. However, transparency has proven to be problematic also in 
some more structured decision processes, such as the cases [1] or [2], though, in these cases 
respective processes were somewhat poorly visible for the participants (insiders).  
 
Causes for poor transparency in these cases seem to be rooted in divergent problem perceptions 
(cases [2], [4], [12]) and expectations (case [1]). These perceptions give basis for the assumptions 
what the stakeholders regard as adequate, how the participants relate to each other and how they 
communicate their assumptions, expectations and world-views. 
26 of 31 5. Conclusions 
Since decision-making in many of the cases is still ongoing, it is too early to draw overarching 
conclusions, and as the cases differ from each other to a great extent – foremost in terms of study 
focus, country-specific political-administrative context, and the nature of the participatory 
process –, it would not be appropriate to make deep generalizations on the basis of all case 
studies. 
 
However, what the cases have shown so far is that each of the four legitimacy criteria is a 
complex concept, encompassing many different aspects. For example, understanding inclusion 
needs the consideration of the object as well as the dynamics of inclusion that relate to different 
time points of decision process. In several of the cases, responsibilities and resources have been 
ineffectively shared between different actors from various governance levels; however, the exact 
implications of these observations on accountability are still questionable. Several of the 
legitimacy challenges in multilevel governance can be observed in the cases, for example the 
poor inclusion of certain concerns at some time points of the decision process, difficulties in 
being accountable towards multiple levels simultaneously, or the poor visibility of the decision 
process either for the general public or for the immediate participants. However, the causes of 
these problems are not very straightforward. For example, the informality-formality interface 
comes up almost in all of the four legitimacy criteria, but it is not very clear how does this 
exactly relate to the legitimacy problems in case of each criterion, e.g. to what extent should 
participation be formalized in multilevel governance contexts, or how does informality affect 
inclusion or transparency? If one intends to gain better understanding of the causes for the 
legitimacy challenges in multi-level governance of biodiversity, these issues deserve attention in 
further research. 
 
However, several of the cases have demonstrated that conflictive situations can well be turned 
into agreements where different interests are better acknowledged and included, actors are more 
responsive about their performance, and processes are more clearly visible for those affected by 
them. Achieving acceptable outcomes in such processes requires from all participants openness 
and willingness to learn from the process as well as from each other. 
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